MITM/Wireless - Revision history

Admin: /* WiFi Pineapple */

2026-06-19T14:32:39Z

WiFi Pineapple

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:32, 19 June 2026
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	* '''Capture''' — Harvests WPA handshake frames for offline cracking.		* '''Capture''' — Harvests WPA handshake frames for offline cracking.

	The Pineapple's combination of KARMA, [[SSLStrip]], and a captive-portal engine makes it a complete rogue-AP platform. For full details, see the [[~~Wireless~~ Pineapple]] page.		The Pineapple's combination of KARMA, [[SSLStrip]], and a captive-portal engine makes it a complete rogue-AP platform. For full details, see the [[Wifi Pineapple]] page.

	== MANA (Modified Advanced Next-generation Attack) ==		== MANA (Modified Advanced Next-generation Attack) ==

Admin: /* WiFi Pineapple */

2026-06-19T14:32:31Z

WiFi Pineapple

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:32, 19 June 2026
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	== WiFi Pineapple ==		== WiFi Pineapple ==

	{{Main\|~~Wireless~~ Pineapple}}		{{Main\|Wifi Pineapple}}

	The [[~~Wireless Pineapple\|WiFi~~ Pineapple]] is a dedicated hardware platform by Hak5 that transformed wireless MITM from a multi-tool command-line exercise into a point-and-click operation. Originally released in 2008, it has evolved through seven major hardware revisions (Mark I through Mark VII).		The [[Wifi Pineapple]] is a dedicated hardware platform by Hak5 that transformed wireless MITM from a multi-tool command-line exercise into a point-and-click operation. Originally released in 2008, it has evolved through seven major hardware revisions (Mark I through Mark VII).

	The Pineapple integrates KARMA, deauthentication, SSL stripping, captive-portal phishing, and credential harvesting into a single pocket-sized device with a web-based interface. It is the most recognizable wireless penetration testing tool in existence.		The Pineapple integrates KARMA, deauthentication, SSL stripping, captive-portal phishing, and credential harvesting into a single pocket-sized device with a web-based interface. It is the most recognizable wireless penetration testing tool in existence.

Admin: Restructure to match MITM/Wired format: overview, classic vs modern approaches, table, defenses, and related pages. Add WiFi Pineapple, MANA, PMKID, WPA3 transition attacks, and captive portal techniques. (via update-page on MediaWiki MCP Server)

2026-06-19T14:10:16Z

Restructure to match MITM/Wired format: overview, classic vs modern approaches, table, defenses, and related pages. Add WiFi Pineapple, MANA, PMKID, WPA3 transition attacks, and captive portal techniques. (via update-page on MediaWiki MCP Server)

Show changes

Unknown user: Admin moved page Man in the Middle/Wireless to MITM/Wireless

2022-03-05T20:41:13Z

Admin moved page Man in the Middle/Wireless to MITM/Wireless

← Older revision	Revision as of 20:41, 5 March 2022
(No difference)

Admin: /* Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi */

2016-08-21T20:55:57Z

Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:55, 21 August 2016
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	The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).		The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).

	Vacuuming up raw 802.11 frames to eavesdrop on network neighbors is possible, but will ~~likely break Layer 3 of the network model and~~ is not a true ~~or effective~~ MITM attack~~. It will allow you to partially eavesdrop on some traffic~~.		Vacuuming up raw 802.11 frames to eavesdrop on network neighbors is possible, but will lead to information loss. It is not as effective as a true MITM attack at Layer 3.

	=Links=		=Links=

Admin: /* Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi */

2016-08-21T20:55:05Z

Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:55, 21 August 2016
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	The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).		The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).

	Vacuuming up raw 802.11 frames to eavesdrop on network neighbors is possible, but is not a true or effective MITM attack. It will allow you to partially eavesdrop on some traffic.		Vacuuming up raw 802.11 frames to eavesdrop on network neighbors is possible, but will likely break Layer 3 of the network model and is not a true or effective MITM attack. It will allow you to partially eavesdrop on some traffic.

	=Links=		=Links=

Admin: /* Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi */

2016-08-21T20:54:48Z

Why You ARP Spoof on Wifi

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:54, 21 August 2016
Line 65:		Line 65:
	The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).		The reason you need to ARP spoof is because it is the only reliable way of tapping/controlling the communication channel. Normally, 802.11 frames from the AP not intended for you are dropped. While you can disable that behavior, it's also more difficult to process 802.11 frames at Layer 3 without controlling the communication channel (noise/error/etc).

	~~Even powering through and grabbing all~~ raw 802.11 frames ~~won't allow you~~ to ~~conduct~~ a true ~~man-in-the-middle~~ attack ~~- just~~ eavesdrop on (some) traffic.		Vacuuming up raw 802.11 frames to eavesdrop on network neighbors is possible, but is not a true or effective MITM attack. It will allow you to partially eavesdrop on some traffic.

	=Links=		=Links=

Admin: /* What Network Neighbors Shouldn't But Could Easily See */

2016-08-21T20:53:11Z

What Network Neighbors Shouldn't But Could Easily See

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:53, 21 August 2016
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	===What Network Neighbors Shouldn't But Could Easily See===		===What Network Neighbors Shouldn't But Could Easily See===

			TLDR: Layer 3 is partially visible. Requires good equipment.

	To truly eavesdrop on someone else on the same network, an attacker either needs to carry out the attack at Layer 3 and 4 (e.g., a network-level ARP spoofing attack) or an interface that can fetch raw 802.11 frames, and do the best it can to decode them.		To truly eavesdrop on someone else on the same network, an attacker either needs to carry out the attack at Layer 3 and 4 (e.g., a network-level ARP spoofing attack) or an interface that can fetch raw 802.11 frames, and do the best it can to decode them.

Admin: /* What Network Neighbors Can't See */

2016-08-21T20:52:50Z

What Network Neighbors Can't See

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:52, 21 August 2016
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	===What Network Neighbors Can't See===		===What Network Neighbors Can't See===

			TLDR: Layer 3 is partially visible, but error-prone. Requires good equipment.

	Your nefarious coworker, who is also a network neighbor, has a wifi card and is attempting to eavesdrop on your traffic. In theory, the coworker should not be able to see any frames passing between you and the AP - the network card will drop any packets not intended for it.		Your nefarious coworker, who is also a network neighbor, has a wifi card and is attempting to eavesdrop on your traffic. In theory, the coworker should not be able to see any frames passing between you and the AP - the network card will drop any packets not intended for it.

Admin: /* What Network Neighbors Can See */

2016-08-21T20:52:23Z

What Network Neighbors Can See

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:52, 21 August 2016
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	===What Network Neighbors Can See===		===What Network Neighbors Can See===

	TLDR: Layer 1 and Layer 2 are completely visible to a network neighbor.		TLDR: Layer 1 and Layer 2 are completely visible to a network neighbor. Layer 3 is partially visible.

	Now, suppose the nefarious eavesdropper is not a stranger who moves in next door, but your coworker in the next cubicle over. How is information on a wifi network protected among the clients on that network?		Now, suppose the nefarious eavesdropper is not a stranger who moves in next door, but your coworker in the next cubicle over. How is information on a wifi network protected among the clients on that network?