A Treatise of Human Nature

Summary

Book I: Of the Understanding

Part I: Of Ideas, their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, etc.

• Sect. 1: Of the Origin of our Ideas: All perceptions are either forceful Impressions (sensations, emotions) or fainter Ideas (thoughts); all ideas are copies of impressions.
• Sect. 2: Division of the Subject: Outlines the plan for investigating human understanding.
• Sect. 3: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination: Memory preserves the order and form of original impressions; imagination rearranges ideas more freely.
• Sect. 4: Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas: Ideas are associated through Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect.
• Sect. 5: Of Relations: Discusses philosophical relations (comparisons) vs. natural relations (associations).
• Sect. 6: Of Modes and Substances: Critiques the idea of substance as an unknown substratum; it's merely a collection of associated simple ideas.
• Sect. 7: Of Abstract Ideas: Argues abstract ideas are actually particular ideas made general in their representation by association with a general term.

Part II: Of the Ideas of Space and Time

• Sect. 1: Of the infinite Divisibility of our Ideas of Space and Time: Argues our ideas of space and time are composed of a finite number of parts, not infinitely divisible.
• Sect. 2: Of the infinite Divisibility of Space and Time: Extends the argument to space and time themselves, suggesting they are not infinitely divisible based on the limits of our perceptions.
• Sect. 3: Of the other Qualities of our Ideas of Space and Time: Discusses the nature of points and the composition of space/time ideas.
• Sect. 4: Objections Answer'd: Addresses mathematical objections regarding infinite divisibility.
• Sect. 5: The Same Subject continu’d: Further arguments linking space, time, and motion.
• Sect. 6: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence: The idea of existence is inseparable from the idea of an object; belief in external objects arises from the constancy and coherence of certain impressions, shaped by imagination.

Part III: Of Knowledge and Probability

• Sect. 1: Of Knowledge: True knowledge (certainty) only comes from relations of ideas (math, logic).
• Sect. 2: Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect: Reasoning about matters of fact is based on cause and effect, which is discovered only through experience, not reason alone. Requires contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction.
• Sect. 3: Why a Cause is always Necessary?: We cannot demonstrate that everything must have a cause; this belief arises from experience and custom.
• Sect. 4: Of the Component Parts of our Reasonings concerning Cause and Effect: Breaks down the process of causal inference.
• Sect. 5: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory: Causal reasoning begins with a present impression or memory.
• Sect. 6: Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea: The crucial step in causal inference (predicting an effect from a cause, or inferring a cause from an effect) is based on custom or habit developed through repeated experience, not logical deduction.
• Sect. 7: Of the Nature of the Idea or Belief: Belief is not a separate idea but a particular feeling or manner of conceiving an idea—making it more vivid, forceful, and steady.
• Sect. 8: Of the Causes of Belief: Belief arises when the vividness of a present impression is transferred to a related idea through customary association.
• Sect. 9: Of the Effects of other Relations and other Habits: Other relations (resemblance, contiguity) and habits can also influence belief, but less powerfully than causation.
• Sect. 10: Of the Influence of Belief: Belief strongly influences passions and imagination.
• Sect. 11: Of the Probability of Chances: Explains how we form beliefs about probability based on the proportion of chances.
• Sect. 12: Of the Probability of Causes: Explains how we reason probabilistically when experience shows imperfect or mixed causal conjunctions.
• Sect. 13: Of Unphilosophical Probability: Discusses common but less rational influences on belief (e.g., recent events).
• Sect. 14: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion: Argues we have no sensory impression of necessary connection between objects. The idea arises from an internal impression—the feeling of determination the mind experiences when moving habitually from cause to effect.
• Sect. 15: Rules by which to judge of Causes and Effects: Provides guidelines for sound causal reasoning based on experience.
• Sect. 16: Of the Reason of Animals: Animals learn and infer from experience (custom) similarly to humans.

Part IV: Of the Sceptical and other Systems of Philosophy

• Sect. 1: Of Scepticism with regard to Reason: Argues that even demonstrative reasoning is subject to doubt due to the fallibility of our faculties, leading to mitigated certainty.
• Sect. 2: Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses: Critiques the belief in the continued, distinct existence of external objects; this belief arises from imagination acting on patterns in impressions, not from reason or senses themselves. Profound skepticism results.
• Sect. 3: Of the Antient Philosophy: Criticizes concepts like substance and occult qualities in ancient thought.
• Sect. 4: Of the Modern Philosophy: Criticizes the primary/secondary quality distinction in modern philosophy.
• Sect. 5: Of the Immateriality of the Soul: Argues the question of whether the soul is material or immaterial is unintelligible, as we have no clear idea of substance.
• Sect. 6: Of Personal Identity: Argues there is no impression of a continuous, simple self. The "self" is just a bundle or collection of constantly changing perceptions linked by resemblance and causation, mistaken for identity by the imagination.
• Sect. 7: Conclusion of this Book: Reflects on the deep skepticism resulting from philosophical inquiry; concludes that nature (custom, habit, passion) compels belief and action, rescuing us from paralyzing doubt. Philosophy should induce modesty and caution.

Book II: Of the Passions

Part I: Of Pride and Humility

• Sect. 1: Division of the Subject: Introduces classification of passions (direct/indirect, calm/violent). Pride/humility are indirect passions.
• Sect. 2: Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes: Object is always the self; causes are qualities related to the self producing pleasure (pride) or pain (humility). Requires a double relation of impressions and ideas.
• Sect. 3: Whence these Objects and Causes are Deriv'd: Based on natural constitution and experience.
• Sect. 4: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas: Explains the double relation mechanism: the cause (e.g., a beautiful house) has an idea related to the idea of the self (object), and the sensation (pleasure) produced by the cause resembles the sensation of pride.
• Sect. 5: Of the Influence of these Relations on Pride and Humility: Provides examples confirming the double relation theory.
• Sect. 6: Limitations of this System: The cause must be closely related, stable, and exclusively associated with the self. General rules also play a role.
• Sect. 7: Of Vice and Virtue: Virtuous character/actions cause pride; vicious ones cause humility, via the double relation.
• Sect. 8: Of Beauty and Deformity: Beauty associated with oneself causes pride; deformity causes humility.
• Sect. 9: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages: Possessions, property, etc., related to the self influence pride/humility.
• Sect. 10: Of Property and Riches: Explores how the relation of property links objects to the self, producing pride.
• Sect. 11: Of the Love of Fame: Desire for good reputation arises from pride and sympathy with others' opinions of us.
• Sect. 12: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals: Animals exhibit behaviors analogous to pride and humility.

Part II: Of Love and Hatred

• Sect. 1: Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred: Object is another person; cause is something related to that person producing pleasure (love) or pain (hatred). Also operates via a double relation of impressions and ideas.
• Sect. 2: Experiments to confirm this System: Thought experiments demonstrating the double relation for love/hatred.
• Sect. 3: Difficulties Solv'd: Addresses potential objections or complex cases.
• Sect. 4: Of the Love of Relations: Explains love/hatred towards relatives through association.
• Sect. 5: Of our Esteem for the Rich and Powerful: We esteem the wealthy/powerful primarily through sympathy with the pleasure we imagine their advantages give them.
• Sect. 6: Of Benevolence and Anger: Love is naturally attended by benevolence (desire for the person's good); hatred by anger (desire for their harm).
• Sect. 7: Of Compassion: Pity arises from sympathy with another's suffering.
• Sect. 8: Of Malice and Envy: Malice (pleasure in others' misfortune) and envy (displeasure at others' good fortune) are explained through comparison and sympathy.
• Sect. 9: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger with Compassion and Malice: Complex emotional blends are possible.
• Sect. 10: Of Respect and Contempt: Respect is a mix of love and humility; contempt a mix of hatred and pride.
• Sect. 11: Of the Amorous Passion, or Love betwixt the Sexes: Analyzes romantic love as a compound passion.
• Sect. 12: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals: Animals exhibit analogous behaviors.

Part III: Of the Will and Direct Passions

• Sect. 1: Of Liberty and Necessity: Argues human actions are caused by motives and character just as physical events are caused (necessity = constant conjunction + mental inference). Denies liberty of indifference (uncaused choice) as unintelligible.
• Sect. 2: The same Subject continu’d: Argues this view of necessity is compatible with morality, responsibility, reward, and punishment. True liberty is liberty of spontaneity (acting according to one's will, without external constraint).
• Sect. 3: Of the influencing Motives of the Will: Argues reason alone cannot motivate action; it can only direct pre-existing passions. Famous quote: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions..."
• Sect. 4: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions: Discusses factors influencing the strength of passions.
• Sect. 5: Of the Effects of Custom: Custom strengthens habits and influences passions.
• Sect. 6: Of the Influence of the Imagination on the Passions: Vividness and manner of conception affect emotional response.
• Sect. 7: Of Contiguity, and Distance in Space and Time: Ideas of things near in space or time have a stronger influence on passions.
• Sect. 8: The same Subject continu’d: Further examples of space/time effects.
• Sect. 9: Of the Direct Passions: Discusses passions arising directly from pleasure/pain (desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear).
• Sect. 10: Of Curiosity, or the Love of Truth: Explains curiosity as a passion deriving pleasure from the pursuit of knowledge.

Book III: Of Morals

Part I: Of Virtue and Vice in General

• Sect. 1: Moral Distinctions not Deriv'd from Reason: Moral judgments are not conclusions of reason (like math or matters of fact). Reason deals with truth/falsehood; morality involves motivating sentiments. Argues against deriving "ought" from "is."
• Sect. 2: Moral Distinctions Deriv'd from a Moral Sense: Moral distinctions arise from feelings or sentiments of approval (pleasure = virtue) or disapproval (pain = vice) felt by the observer when contemplating a character or action. This constitutes a "moral sense."

Part II: Of Justice and Injustice

• Sect. 1: Justice, whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?: Argues justice is an artificial virtue, arising from conventions and education, not directly from innate human nature like benevolence.
• Sect. 2: Of the Origin of Justice and Property: Justice (rules of property, etc.) originates from human conventions designed to remedy the problems caused by selfishness and scarcity in society. It serves self-interest and public utility.
• Sect. 3: Of the Rules, which determine Property: Rules for property ownership (occupation, prescription, etc.) are based on convention for social peace and utility.
• Sect. 4: Of the Transference of Property by Consent: Rules for transferring property are necessary artificial conventions.
• Sect. 5: Of the Obligation of Promises: Promise-keeping is also an artificial convention invented to create trust and facilitate cooperation; there's no natural obligation.
• Sect. 6: Some farther Reflections concerning Justice and Injustice: Reinforces that justice arises from self-interest guided by convention, and its moral approval comes from sympathy with the public interest it serves.
• Sect. 7: Of the Origin of Government: Government is a further artificial convention created to enforce the rules of justice when societies grow larger and temptations to injustice increase.
• Sect. 8: Of the Source of Allegiance: Obligation to obey government arises from the same foundation as justice—social utility and convention—not from specific promises (like an original contract).
• Sect. 9: Of the Measures of Allegiance: Allegiance is conditional on the government providing protection; resistance is justified against tyranny that destroys security.
• Sect. 10: Of the Objects of Allegiance: Rules determining legitimate rulers (succession, conquest, etc.) are based on convention and utility.
• Sect. 11: Of the Laws of Nations: International morality is also based on convention and utility, but weaker than domestic justice.
• Sect. 12: Of Chastity and Modesty: These virtues are explained primarily as conventions related to social utility (maintaining family structures).

Part III: Of the Other Virtues and Vices

• Sect. 1: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices: Virtues like benevolence, kindness, generosity are natural virtues because they are approved of directly through sympathy due to their immediate agreeableness or utility to others or the person themselves.
• Sect. 2: Of Greatness of Mind: Analyzes virtues like courage, tranquility, ambition as qualities useful or agreeable to the possessor.
• Sect. 3: Of Goodness and Benevolence: Analyzes virtues like generosity, compassion, humanity as qualities useful or agreeable to others.
• Sect. 4: Of Natural Abilities: Argues qualities like intelligence, wit, good judgment can be considered virtues because they are useful or agreeable; the distinction between "moral virtues" and "natural abilities" is not sharp.
• Sect. 5: Some farther Reflections concerning the Natural Virtues: Discusses nuances like the role of context and general rules.
• Sect. 6: Conclusion of this Book: Summarizes the sentiment-based theory of morality: virtue consists in mental qualities useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others, approved of via sympathy and a moral sense.

Quotes

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.

not... the source. huh.

There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.

but...???!?!/ even simple senations are themselves complex. simple smells, due to molecules and compounds.

The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other.

wha about abstract concepts tho?!?

I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions?

But if any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as it is certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.

a ball that is grue

we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.

the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas.

but this is tatologcal. sensory experiences require the senses. by contrast the only wa to communicate abstract mathematics is precisely an appeal to the ideas and not the impression. there isno impression.

We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having actually tasted it.

the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them.

recursion is possible. the doorway to inception...

all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions.

biologically false. spiders and snakes.

when it has been disputed whether there be any INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion.

Impressions way be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea.

this is totally ignoring absract aything.

when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea: or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION.

ugh. so oversimplistic.

The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phaenomena,

It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those qualities, which make objects admit of comparison, and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced. But if we diligently consider them, we shall find that without difficulty they may be comprised under seven general heads, which may be considered as the sources of all philosophical relation.

(1) The first is RESEMBLANCE:

(2) IDENTITY may be esteemed a second species of relation. This relation I here consider as applied in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects; without examining the nature and foundation of personal identity, which shall find its place afterwards.

(3) After identity the most universal and comprehensive relations are those of SPACE and TIME,

(4) All those objects, which admit of QUANTITY, or NUMBER,

{{Quote| (5) When any two objects possess the same QUALITY in common, the DEGREES, in which they possess it, form a fifth species of relation.

(6) The relation of CONTRARIETY may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule, THAT NO RELATION OF ANY KIND CAN SUBSIST WITHOUT SOME DEGREE OF RESEMBLANCE. But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of them an idea of the object;

(7) All other objects, such as fire and water, heat and cold, are only found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of their causes or effects; which relation of cause and effect is a seventh philosophical relation, as well as a natural one.

whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist.

The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of Simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection.

classes and instances... maybe

A great philosopher [Dr. Berkeley.] has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them.

As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities; which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by representing at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities, or by, representing no particular one at all. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying an infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly inferred in favour of the latter: and our abstract ideas have been supposed to represent no particular degree either of quantity or quality. But that this inference is erroneous, I shall endeavour to make appear, first, by proving, that it is utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing, that though the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality, in such a manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflection and conversation.

And we may here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable, are also different. For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? In order therefore to know, whether abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which we abstract from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and different from those, which we retain as essential parts of them. But it is evident at first sight, that the precise length of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself nor the precise degree of any quality from the quality.

wut. the length of a line is not a line. how is that hard.

Thirdly, it is a principle generally received in philosophy that everything in nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible. But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply, is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character.

Thus should we mention the word triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it, and should we afterwards assert, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we overlooked at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falshood of this proposition, though it be true with relation to that idea, which we had formed.

However this may be, it is certain that we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term;

wrong. scarecrow arg. there exist objects with nooooooo sensory or individual form that we can hold in our mind

First then I observe, that when we mention any great number, such as a thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it, but only a power of producing such an idea, by its adequate idea of the decimals, under which the number is comprehended. This imperfection, however, in our ideas, is never felt in our reasonings; which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas.

wow. obviously this guy is not a number theorist.

the number 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111...111 basically blows the whole arg out of the water

we do not annex distinct and compleat ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are composed.

of course... we abstract vvvvvvolumes of detail into a single word or term.

Whatever has the air of a paradox, and is contrary to the first and most unprejudiced notions of mankind, is often greedily embraced by philosophers, as shewing the superiority of their science, which coued discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception. On the other hand, anything proposed to us, which causes surprize and admiration, gives such a satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions, and will never be persuaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation.

I cannot give a more evident instance than in the doctrine of infinite divisibility, with the examination of which I shall begin this subject of the ideas of space and time.

It is universally allowed, that the capacity of the mind is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity:

capacity is a tricky word. do we havethe capacity to hold infinity in our minds? maybe by name... by abstract principle.

And though it were not allowed, it would be sufficiently evident from the plainest observation and experience. It is also obvious, that whatever is capable of being divided in infinitum, must consist of an infinite number of parts, and that it is impossible to set any bounds to the number of parts, without setting bounds at the same time to the division.

limit definition due to cauchy... as small as you would like

that the idea, which we form of any finite quality, is not infinitely divisible, but that by proper distinctions and separations we may run up this idea to inferior ones,

In rejecting the infinite capacity of the mind, we suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of its ideas; nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion.

but......... the mind is not what it perceives.... or what it ca comprehend. love exists despite the fact that dogs do not understand it.

What consists of parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable.

again... this conflates, for example, mathematical functions as an abstract concept with mathematical function values discretely

But whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.

wait. really?!? r u serious? i'm sorry but this guy is an idiot.

It is the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the imagination. Put a spot of ink upon paper, fix your eye upon that spot, and retire to such a distance, that, at last you lose sight of it; it is plain, that the moment before it vanished the image or impression was perfectly indivisible.

buuut. still entirely subjective. it is always indivisible or infinitesimal if you cannot see

A microscope or telescope, which renders them visible, produces not any new rays of light, but only spreads those, which always flowed from them; and by that means both gives parts to impressions, which to the naked eye appear simple and uncompounded, and advances to a minimum, what was formerly imperceptible.

The only defect of our senses is, that they give us disproportioned images of things, and represent as minute and uncompounded what is really great and composed of a vast number of parts.

Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension; and through whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arrived at, they can never become inferior to some ideas, which we form.

Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts; otherwise the division would be stopt short by the indivisible parts, which we should immediately arrive at.

If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts: And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible. But that this latter supposition is absurd, I easily convince myself by the consideration of my clear ideas.

When I stop in the addition of parts, the idea of extension ceases to augment; and were I to carry on the addition in infinitum, I clearly perceive, that the idea of extension must also become infinite. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the idea of all infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible [FN 3.].

I may subjoin another argument proposed by a noted author [Mons. MALEZIEU], which seems to me very strong and beautiful. It is evident, that existence in itself belongs only to unity, and is never applicable to number, but on account of the unites, of which the number is composed. Twenty men may be said to exist; but it is only because one, two, three, four, &c. are existent,

integers... geez

All this reasoning takes place with regard to time; along with an additional argument, which it may be proper to take notice of. It is a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738 every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another. It is certain then, that time, as it exists, must be composed of indivisible moments.

It is true, mathematicians are wont to say, that there are here equally strong arguments on the other side of the question, and that the doctrine of indivisible points is also liable to unanswerable objections. Before I examine these arguments and objections in detail, I will here take them in a body, and endeavour by a short and decisive reason to prove at once, that it is utterly impossible they can have any just foundation.

It is an established maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist.

These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical; since it is certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which it is an evident absurdity to pretend to.

giant eyeroll

No discovery coued have been made more happily for deciding all controversies concerning ideas, than that abovementioned, that impressions always take the precedency of them, and that every idea, with which the imagination is furnished, first makes its appearance in a correspondent impression.

too easy

though many of our ideas are so obscure, that it is almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition.

All abstract ideas are really nothing but particular ones, considered in a certain light; but being annexed to general terms, they are able to represent a vast variety, and to comprehend objects, which, as they are alike in some particulars, are in others vastly wide of each other.

From these phenomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discovered some PERCEIVABLE succession of changeable objects.

time is change. hmm.

but this defines things too subjectively... it seems

Links

PDF version: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1739book1.pdf

Related - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/enquiry.pdf