Genealogy of Morals

Notes

From the Cambridge Texts Version

...can justifiably be regarded as one of the key texts of European intellectual modernity.

It is a deeply disturbing book that retains its capacity to shock and disconcert the modern reader. Nietzsche himself was well aware of the character of the book. There are moments in the text where he reveals his own sense of alarm at what he is discovering about human origins and development, especially the perverse nature of the human animal, the being he calls "the sick animal" (GM, III, 14). Although the Genealogy is one of the darkest books ever written, it is also, paradoxically, a book full of hope and anticipation.

Nietzsche finds that "all modern judgments about men and things" are smeared with an over-moralistic language; the characteristic featureof modern souls and modern books is to be found in their "moralistic mendaciousness" (GM, III,19).

From Preface

In the Preface, Nietzsche makes clear the aim of the book: it is to answer the question quoted below. "Under what conditions did man construct the value judgments good and evil? And what is their intrinsic worth?" In this book Nietzsche questions the widely-held notions of good and evil, and pulls apart notions of "good". At the center of the book is the following thesis, also from the preface:

What if the "good" man represents not merely a retrogression but even a danger, a temptation, a narcotic drug enabling the present to live at the expense of the future? More comfortable, less hazardous, perhaps, but also baser, more petty - so that morality itself would be responsible for man, as a species, failing to reach the peak of magnificence of which he is capable? What if morality should turn out to be the danger of dangers? ...

- Preface, VI

Unfortunately, this is an extremely toxic and dangerous notion to be planted in the wrong mind. This is one of the troubles with interpreting Nietzsche - he writes in generalities and metaphors, so he speaks to every a little differently.

As the book launches into its opening, there are several attacks on "the Jews", a group that Nietzsche uses throughout the book, in very biting ways, to illustrate what he sees as an inversion of values that was introduced by Judaism and the Judeo-Christian tradition - and culminating in "Jesus of Nazareth, the gospel of love made flesh, the 'redeemer', who brought blessing and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinners - what was he but temptation in its most sinister and irresistible form, bringing men by a roundabout way to precisely those Jewish values and renovations of the ideal?"

Nietzsche also refers to the Judeo-Christian moral value system as "slave ethics" - a repugnant term from a different time. As Nietzsche scores points trolling everyone from psychologists to Jews, to Germans, to Christians, it becomes clear how an ignorant mind with ill-formed ideas could easily twist this book into an intellectual hammer with which to smash everything.

This is how Nietzsche is, though - he has his own world-view and perspective and system of thinking and internal logic, and if you understand it all (if you've "read all of his prior books" as he would put it) it all makes sense - but Nietzsche is tone-deaf to the implications his moral attitudes and proposed value systems would have in more ignorant minds.

This book brings to mind a quote about Nietzsche from Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, which seems to apply to virtually every page of this book:

He [Nietzsche] has never conceived of the man who, with all the fearlessness and stubborn pride of the superman, nevertheless does not inflict pain because he has no wish to do so. Does any one suppose that Lincoln acted as he did from fear of hell?

- Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy

Summary

Preface

Sections 1-8: Nietzsche introduces the work's purpose: to investigate the origin of our moral prejudices. He expresses dissatisfaction with previous attempts (particularly what he calls the "English psychologists," likely referring to utilitarians) who offered simplistic explanations for the origin of concepts like "good" based on utility or habit. He emphasizes the need to question the value of these values, especially the altruistic or "unegoistic" ones that modern society prizes. He wants to understand where our concepts of "Good and Evil" actually came from, suggesting their origins are far from self-evident or divinely inspired. He frames this as a task of "genealogy"—tracing the historical lineage and psychological conditions that gave rise to moral valuations.

First Essay: Good and Evil, Good and Bad

Overall Argument: This essay contrasts two fundamental types of morality: "Master Morality" and "Slave Morality." Nietzsche argues that the concepts "Good and Evil" (as commonly understood) are the product of a "slave revolt in morality," which inverted the original, aristocratic value system of "Good and Bad."

Sections 1-5: Nietzsche refutes the idea that "good" originally meant "useful" or "unegoistic." He posits that the original concept of "good" arose from the ruling class, the nobles, the powerful, and the healthy (the "masters"). They experienced their own qualities—strength, health, power, nobility—as "good" in a self-affirming way. "Bad" was simply an afterthought, referring to the common, the weak, the plebeian – those unlike the masters. This is Master Morality.

Sections 6-11: Nietzsche introduces the Slave Revolt in Morality, which he attributes primarily to the priestly caste and the powerless masses (symbolically linked to Judea). Fueled by ressentiment (a deep-seated feeling of impotence, envy, and hatred towards the masters they could not overcome physically), the slaves inverted the aristocratic values. The masters' "good" (power, strength, health) became "evil." Conversely, the slaves' own characteristics (humility, pity, patience, weakness) were elevated to become "good." This creates Slave Morality, which defines itself first by identifying an external "evil" enemy (the master) and then defines "good" as its opposite. This morality emphasizes intentions over actions and values qualities beneficial to the collective herd.

Sections 12-17: Nietzsche elaborates on the conflict between these two value systems, using Rome (symbolizing master morality) and Judea (symbolizing slave morality) as historical archetypes. He analyzes etymologies to support his claim that "good" originally related to nobility and "bad" to commonness. He argues that slave morality, particularly through Christianity, ultimately triumphed in the West, leading to the values prevalent in his time. He concludes by stressing the ongoing, often hidden, conflict between these opposing valuations and the need to understand this history to evaluate our current morals.

Second Essay: Guilt, Bad Conscience, and the Like

Argument: This essay investigates the origins of guilt, conscience, responsibility, and punishment. Nietzsche argues that the "bad conscience" — the feeling of guilt and self-reproach — arose from the internalization of humanity's aggressive instincts when forced into society.

Sections 1-5: Nietzsche explores how the capacity to make promises — a prerequisite for social order and responsibility — was cultivated. He argues it wasn't a natural development but was "bred" into humans through harsh, painful methods (a "mnemotechnics" of pain) to create memory and reliability. Punishment served as a tool to instill this memory.

Sections 6-13: He analyzes the origin and purpose of punishment. Nietzsche argues that punishment did not originally arise from ideas of free will or moral culpability (guilt). Its origins are tied to power dynamics, anger, establishing equivalences (like debt repayment), and deterring others (he critiques the idea that punishment aims to awaken a feeling of guilt). The meaning and purpose of punishment have changed drastically over time, often layered upon older practices without a single, consistent rationale.

Sections 14-18: Nietzsche presents his central thesis on the Bad Conscience. He suggests that when humans were forced into the confines of society and the state, their natural instincts for aggression, cruelty, and freedom could no longer be discharged outwardly. These instincts were turned inward, against the self. This internalized aggression is the origin of the "bad conscience" — a deep-seated feeling of guilt, self-torment, and dissatisfaction. It is an "illness" that humanity developed under the pressure of socialization.

Sections 19-25: Nietzsche connects the concept of guilt (Schuld) to the concept of debt (Schulden). The relationship between individuals and the community, and later between humanity and its ancestors or gods, is framed as a debtor-creditor relationship. He argues that the development of monotheism, especially Christianity with its concept of original sin and debt to God, intensified this feeling of guilt and indebtedness to an extreme, making the debt unpayable and maximizing the power of the bad conscience and the priests who administer it.

Third Essay: What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals

Argument: This essay examines the meaning and pervasive influence of the "ascetic ideal"—the valuation of self-denial, chastity, poverty, humility, and the suppression of sensual life—across different human types: artists, philosophers, priests, and scientists. Nietzsche seeks to understand why this seemingly life-denying ideal has held such power.

Sections 1-7: Nietzsche begins by questioning what the ascetic ideal means for artists (using Wagner as an example) and philosophers (using Schopenhauer). He suggests that for artists, it's often superficial or borrowed. For philosophers, ascetic practices (simplicity, detachment) often serve as favorable conditions for contemplation and intellectual independence—a means to their specific expression of the Will to Power (the drive for knowledge and mastery).

Sections 8-22: This is the core of the essay. Nietzsche argues that the priest is the primary agent and embodiment of the ascetic ideal. The priest uses this ideal to minister to the "sick herd" — the majority of humanity suffering from physiological decline, ressentiment, and the bad conscience described in the previous essays. The ascetic ideal gives their suffering meaning: it interprets suffering as punishment, a test, or a path to salvation. It redirects ressentiment harmlessly (e.g., towards petty acts of "charity" or self-mortification) and provides a framework that allows the suffering masses to endure life rather than succumb to suicidal nihilism. The ascetic ideal, wielded by the priest, preserves life, but only by making it "sicker," organizing the sick, and furthering a life-denying perspective. It is the priest's primary tool of power.

Sections 23-27: Nietzsche turns to modern science. He argues that while science often sees itself as opposed to the ascetic ideal (especially its religious forms), it remains fundamentally indebted to it. Science's core value—the unconditional will to truth—is itself an ascetic ideal, a faith in the supreme value of truth without questioning the value of truth itself. Science has destroyed religious dogma but hasn't overcome the underlying ascetic foundation; it merely represents its latest, most rigorous, but still unexamined form.

Section 28: Nietzsche concludes that the ascetic ideal has dominated because humanity needed a goal; it abhors a vacuum of meaning. Faced with the potential meaninglessness of suffering and existence, humanity would rather will nothingness (via the ascetic ideal) than not will at all. The ascetic ideal, despite its problematic nature, provided an interpretation, a meaning, that saved humanity from a paralyzing nihilism. The challenge now, he implies, is to move beyond this ideal by creating new, life-affirming values.

Quotes

Preface

We have no right to isolated thoughts, whether truthful or erroneous. Our thoughts should grow out of our values with the same necessity as the fruit out of the tree. Our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts should all be intimately related and bear testimony to one will, one health, one soil, one sun. Supposing you find these fruits unpalatable? What concern is that of the trees - or of us, the philosophers?

- Preface, II

Under what conditions did man construct the value judgments good and evil? And what is their intrinsic worth?

- Preface, III

What if the "good" man represents not merely a retrogression but even a danger, a temptation, a narcotic drug enabling the present to live at the expense of the future? More comfortable, less hazardous, perhaps, but also baser, more petty - so that morality itself would be responsible for man, as a species, failing to reach the peak of magnificence of which he is capable? What if morality should turn out to be the danger of dangers? ...

- Preface, VI

Should this treatise seem unintelligible or jarring to some readers, I think the fault need not necessarily be laid at my door. It is plain enough, and it presumes only that the reader will have read my earlier works with some care - for they do, in fact, require careful reading.

- Preface, VIII

First Essay: Good and Evil, Good and Bad

There is nothing very odd about lambs disliking birds of prey, but this is no reason for holding it against large birds of prey that they carry off lambs. And when the lambs whisper among themselves, "These birds of prey are evil, and does not this give us a right to say that whatever is the opposite of a bird of prey must be good?" there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an argument - though the birds of prey will look somewhat quizzically and say, "We have nothing against these good lambs; in fact, we love them; nothing tastes better than a tender lamb."

Links

PDF copy of Cambridge Press edition: http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/GeneologyofMorals.pdf